




India:  Why Fiscal Adjustment Now 
 








India’s growth performance has been impressive over the last two decades.  But its sustainability 
has been in question, first with the 1991 fiscal-balance of payments crisis (BoP), and then again 
after 1997/98, when fiscal deficits returned to the 10 percent of GDP range and government debt 
grew.  This paper analyzes the deterioration in India’s public finances and presents evidence 
suggesting that, in the absence of a fiscal adjustment, low inflation and high reserves may have 
been pursued at the expense of long-run growth and poverty reduction.  Resolving this inflation-
external vulnerability-growth policy trilemma requires fiscal adjustment.  In making its case, the 
paper shows, first, that fiscal fundamentals have weakened after 1997/98 even when compared 
with the pre-1991 crisis period.  This has continued in spite of the recent record lows in interest 
rates.  Second, the fiscal stance is not conducive to long-run growth and poverty reduction 
because capital spending has been cut to accommodate higher interest payments and other current 
spending, with expenditures on the social sectors stagnating.  Third, without a fiscal adjustment, 
the debt burden is likely to reach unmanageable levels by the end of the Tenth Plan period.  In 
contrast, a phased adjustment beginning now and focusing on a relatively small set of reforms is 
likely to improve debt dynamics substantially over the same horizon, while also promoting faster 
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1. Introduction   
India’s economic growth accelerated in the second half of the 1980s along with rising 
fiscal imbalances.  The latter spilled over into current account deficits, depleting reserves and 
leading to a balance-of-payments (BOP) crisis in 1991.  As part of the program of stabilization 
and structural reform that followed the crisis, customs and excise duties were cut and taxes on 
financial intermediation lowered with the object of creating more competitive and efficient real 
and financial sectors.  This marked a break with decades of protection and financial repression.  
The fiscal deficit was also cut and the capital account partially liberalized to attract foreign 
portfolio and direct investment.  As a result of these reforms, the economy grew rapidly and fiscal 
and government debt indicators improved dramatically during the five years 1992/93-1996/97, 
which coincided with the Eighth Plan period.  But during the Ninth Plan period 1997/98-2001/02, 
growth slowed and fiscal deficits went back to their pre-1991 crisis levels, raising concern about 
the slowing pace of fiscal and structural reform.
2  Government debt grew rapidly as revenues fell 
and interest payments climbed, although inflation and interest rates started falling in line with 
global trends toward the end of this period.  Annex 1 contains background material on the 1991 
crisis and summarizes studies on government debt sustainability through the 1990s. 
Looking back over the last two decades, India’s macroeconomic report card has been 
mixed.  Its growth performance during the 1980s was exceeded by only 9 out of 123 countries, 
and that during the 1990s by just 19 out of 137 countries.
3  But India has also ranked high on 
fiscal deficits.  In 2000, out of 74 countries with a population exceeding 10 million, only 7 had 
general government fiscal deficits exceeding 7 percent of GDP.  India was one of them and only 
Turkey and Zimbabwe had higher deficits.
4  Ahluwalia (2002a) presents data showing that India’s 
fiscal and debt indicators are comparable to or worse than those of Argentina, Brazil and Turkey, 
countries that have actually experienced a serious recent macroeconomic crisis.  He nevertheless 
concludes that India is not vulnerable to an external crisis in view of its build up of foreign 
exchange reserves, capital controls, flexible exchange rate system and widespread public 
ownership of banks.  This stands in contrast to 1991, when India suffered a fiscal-BoP crisis with 
fiscal deficits of comparable size but much lower debt.  What has changed is the reserve build-up. 
But does this mean that concern about the fiscal stance is misplaced? 
No, for three key reasons.  The first is that even though growth rose from a 3.5 percent 
trend rate over the previous three decades to close to 6 percent over the 1980s and 1990s, this has 
not been enough.  India starts the twenty-first century with per capita income around half that of 
China and Indonesia, countries that in 1970 were at comparable stages of development.
5  Not 
surprisingly, the National Development Council mandated a target of 8 percent per year in real 
GDP growth for the Tenth Plan (2002/03-2006/07); but the macroeconomic chapter of the Plan 
makes it clear that achieving this goal calls for a substantial cut in the fiscal deficit to raise public 
savings and investment.  The second point is that interest payments are claiming a growing share 
of revenues, limiting government capital expenditure and spending on priority social programs.  
During the 2003/04 Union Budget discussions, the Finance Minister informed the Rajya Sabha 
that "Of our revenue, 50 percent is swallowed by payment of just interest on (government) debt. 
Another 20 percent goes on subsidies and 25 percent on defense. What am I left with?”
6  In other 
words, the quality of the fiscal stance has deteriorated and options for adjustment are going to be 
constrained by the high level and non-discretionary nature of interest payments.  Third, even 
though the high reserves offer insurance against a 1991-type crisis, this does not rule out a fiscal 
                                                      
2 Ahluwalia (2002b), Williamson and Zagha (2002).  
3 Srinivasan (2001). 
4 Acharya (2001, 2002a, 2002b). 
5 World Bank (2003), Figure 1. 
6 Times News Network, Times of India, New Delhi, March 14, 2003.   3
crisis itself.  India is not immune to  a Sargent-Wallace  (1981) outcome, where rising interest 
payments compel the government to resort to inflationary finance, damaging macroeconomic 
credibility and raising real interest rates.  If the high reserves are used to preserve   exchange rate 
stability, that country could have a situation of appreciating real exchange rates and high real 
interest rates, hurting the real sector and lowering growth prospects.  Thus at a minimum,  failure 
to address the fiscal imbalance will hurt growth prospects and set poverty alleviation back. 
An alternative viewpoint argues that with excess capacity in industry and record levels of 
reserves and food stocks, this is the right time for a fiscal expansion to stimulate growth.
7  As is 
shown below, the two main arguments against this reasoning are first, that government debt and 
interest payments have already reached extremely high levels, constraining counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy.  Second, the build up in reserves has not been a fortuitous accident but driven by a 
macroeconomic policy mix designed to keep inflation low and minimize external vulnerability in 
spite of the fiscal deterioration.   
The need for “fiscal adjustment now” arises not because a crisis is imminent but because 
postponing reform is likely to result in an unmanageable debt and interest burden by the end of 
the Tenth Plan period notwithstanding the current low interest rates and burgeoning reserves.  In 
contrast, a phased adjustment beginning now and focusing on a relatively small set of reforms is 
likely to yield substantial, positive benefits over the same horizon and be more conducive to long-
run growth and poverty reduction.  By “adjustment” is not meant an immediate, drastic cut in the 
fiscal deficit.  The only way to do so given the extraordinarily high level of interest payments 
would be to cut capital expenditure even more, which would be undesirable.  Instead, the 
advocated focus is on revenue mobilization and redirecting “non-merit subsidies” toward capital 
and development expenditure.  The paper makes its case first by showing that a key factor in the 
fiscal deterioration during the Ninth Plan period (1997/98-2001/02) has been  the significant 
reform-induced losses in revenue (both indirect tax revenue and financial-repression revenue), 
and also the government's inability to adjust public spending (as interest payments take up an 
increasing share of the budget).  Debt dynamics worsened over 2002/03 despite the record lows in 
interest rates.  The reason for this and the inadvisability of gambling on the persistence of low 
interest rates are spelled out.  Second, it demonstrates that government debt dynamics are 
showing signs of being unsustainable.  The primary deficit (non-interest fiscal deficit) is large and 
real interest rates have converged to growth rates.  Third, the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) 
policy of building up reserves and sterilizing them (to cushion  against external shocks and keep 
inflation low, respectively), coupled with constraints on government spending (because of fiscal 
deficits and public debt) has resulted in low public and private investment, putting long-run 
growth in jeopardy relative to the levels needed for rapid poverty alleviation.  Moreover, while 
higher reserves have increased liquidity, the joint balance sheet of the general government and the 
RBI has weakened.  Fourth, projections show that postponing fiscal adjustment will push the debt 
burden to unmanageable levels by the end of the Tenth Plan period; but a phased adjustment that 
begins immediately will lower deficits and greatly improve spending composition. 
 
Before proceeding, two points are worth noting.  First, structural reforms to underpin 
faster growth are crucial to any fiscal reform scenario.  These are not discussed here; World Bank 
(2003a) contains a detailed discussion.  Second, the Government of India (GoI) and the RBI are 
cognizant of the need for a fiscal adjustment, as evidenced by numerous initiatives and policy 
pronouncements.  The key is to find the momentum for implementation in the present 
environment of high reserves and low interest rates, a momentum this paper hopes to advance. 
   
                                                      
7 Chandrasekhar (2000).   4
2. Macroeconomic  Fundamentals 
2.1  Public Finances and External Vulnerability  
 
Figure 1 depicts trends in the general government’s (center plus states consolidated) gross 
fiscal deficit and debt as percentages of GDP in 1985/86-2002/03.  It shows that the gross fiscal 
deficit averaged 9 percent of GDP before the crisis.  It then fell sharply during the period of high 
growth and fiscal restraint that marked the Eighth Plan period (1992/93-1996/97), but resumed 
growing equally sharply after 1997/98, returning to the 9-10 percent of GDP range during the 














Figure 1 also shows that the ratio of general government debt rose from approximately 58 
percent of GDP in 1985/86 to 85 percent in 2002/03.
8  This debt was the equivalent of $440 
billion with a rupee-to-foreign currency mix of 86:14 compared to 77:23 on the eve of the 1991 
crisis.  Debt of central public enterprises was another 10 percent of GDP, and guarantees by the 
center and states, the latter largely in support of borrowing by loss-making public enterprises in 
power and irrigation, amounted to 12 percent of GDP.  
With fiscal deficit levels in the 10 percent of GDP range and government debt more than 
25 percentage points of GDP higher than the mid-1980s, public finance fundamentals could be 
considered worse than in the pre-1991 crisis period.  Table 1 shows trends in public finance and 
external vulnerability indicators.  Data values over 1985/86-1989/90, the five years preceding the 
1991 crisis, serve as a benchmark.  The 1990s are divided into the period of rapid growth, 
1992/93-96/97, which coincided with the Eighth Plan (shown in the table as 8
th Plan avg.); and 
the slowdown, 97/98-01/02, which coincided with the Ninth Plan period (9
th Plan avg.).
9    
                                                      
8 Throughout this paper, the component of general government debt denominated in foreign currency is valued at 
current exchange rates. 
9 This division of the time periods is used throughout the paper. 



















Fiscal deficit Debt stock
Source : Budget Documents, RBI, Ministry of Finance, IMF and Staff Estimates





The fiscal indicators shown in Table 1 depict a perceptible deterioration during the Ninth 
Plan period.  Gross fiscal deficits returned to the levels of the mid-1980s after being cut sizably 
during the Eighth Plan period.  Revenue deficits (current spending minus revenues, note that 
privatization proceeds are treated as financing, not as revenue) doubled from less than 3 percent 
of GDP in the second half of the 1980s to 6 percent during the Ninth Plan period. Primary deficits 
were reduced substantially during the Eighth Plan period relative to the second half of the 1980s; 
but then rose during the Ninth Plan period.  Comparing the Ninth Plan period with the mid-1980s, 
the fact that the primary deficit was much smaller while the revenue deficit was much larger and 
the gross fiscal deficit about the same can only mean that rising interest payments displaced 
capital expenditure.  General government debt fell from 71 percent of GDP at the end of 1989/90 
to 65 percent at the end of the Eighth Plan period but then rose by 15 percentage points to the end 
of the Ninth Plan, and another five percentage points the following year.  
 
Table 1: Key Macroeconomic Indicators 
% of GDP 












Fiscal and Debt            
Gross fiscal deficit 
1/ 9.0  9.3  7.2  9.3  10.3   
Revenue deficit 
1/ 2.8  4.0  3.6  6.1  6.8   
Primary deficit 
1/ 5.3  4.8  2.1  3.5  3.7   
Debt outstanding  
2/ 70.6  72.5  65.1  79.8  84.9   
External Vulnerability            
Forex reserves $ bn 
2/ 4.0  5.8  26.4  54.0  75.4   
M3/Forex Reserves % 
2/  3694 2329 733 568 469  
Short-term external debt
3/  /Forex reserves % 
2/  365 276 33 16 18  
Current account balance  -2.2  -3.1  -1.2  -0.7  1.0   
Real GDP growth %  5.9 5.6  7.1  5.5  4.4   
Notes :             
1/  For the general government. The figures for 2002/03 are revised estimates for central govt. and staff estimates for state governments.  
2/  For end of last fiscal year in the period.    
3/ External debt with original maturity less than a year plus all long-term debt falling due over the next one year. 
Source: Government budget documents, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy and Annual Report 2001-02, Staff estimates   
 
In contrast, external vulnerability indicators strengthened impressively. Foreign exchange 
reserves steadily built up after the 1991 crisis with a jump of $21 billion in 2002/03, and now 
surpass $95 billion.  The table also shows two standard measures of international liquidity:  broad 
money, or M3, divided by foreign exchange reserves; and short-term external debt divided by 
reserves.
 10,11  M3 was over 3,600 percent, and short-term external debt 365 percent of reserves 
the year before the BOP crisis.  The first liquidity measure fell to less than 500 percent by March 
31, 2003, and the second to a safe 18 percent.  Both measures peaked at or around the time of the 
1991 crisis and have fallen dramatically since.  Their behavior explains why India is not on the 
verge of another BOP crisis in spite of the deterioration in the fiscal fundamentals.   
                                                      
10 M3 is defined as currency with the public, demand deposits with banks, other deposits with Reserve Bank of India, 
post office savings bank deposits and time deposits with banks. 
11 IMF (2000) identifies the ratio of short term external debt to reserves as a key indicator of vulnerability to an 
exchange crisis.  Chang and Velasco (1998) identify international liquidity as a key factor in the East Asian crisis.   6
The shift toward long-term domestic (rupee) debt in government financing after the 1991 
crisis has also boosted liquidity.  The weighted average maturity of debt issued through dated 
securities more than doubled from 6.6 years in 1997/98 to 14.3 in 2001/02.
12  Moreover, over 85 
percent of central and state government securities are held by nationalized banks, The State Bank 
of India, the state-owned Life Insurance Corporation and RBI while the remainder is held by the 
mutual fund, Unit Trust of India, the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(NABARD), employees provident fund and private banks.
13  In short, much of the domestically-
issued debt is in the hands of government-owned or controlled entities. 
2.2  Fiscal Trends  1985/86-2001/02 
Table 2 shows that general government revenues fell considerably during the Ninth Plan 
period relative to the second half of the 1980s.
14  Compared to the second half of the 1980s, 
capital expenditure fell by over three percentage points of GDP during the Ninth Plan period, 
while the sum of interest, administration and pensions rose by three percentage points of GDP 
and a 22 percentage points of revenue.  Developmental spending on health and education 
stagnated, while that on irrigation, power and transport actually declined.  Even the fiscal 
improvement secured during the Eighth Plan period involved a large compression of capital 
spending, as can be seen from the table.  There was a hope that this compression would be offset 
by rising private investment in infrastructure; but with the exception of telecom, this has not 
happened on the desired scale.  As noted in RBI (2003a), page III-46, a larger private role in 
infrastructure would require institutional reform and “economically efficient user charges to 
ensure the reasonable return on investment”.  
 
Table 2: General Government Fiscal Trends 1985/86-2001/02 
 
% of GDP  85/86-89/90 8
th Plan 9
th Plan  02/03 
(unless otherwise defined)  Avg.  Avg.  Avg.  Est. 
1/ 
Revenue 19.4  17.9  17.0  18.4 
Current expenditure 
2/  22.1 21.5  23.1  25.3 
Capital expenditure 
3/  6.4 3.6  3.2  3.5 
Gross fiscal deficit  9.0  7.2  9.3  10.3 
Memo        
Interest 3.8  5.1  5.8  6.5 
Interest/Revenue 19.4  28.5  34.0  35.1 
Irrigation+ power+ transport  4.7  3.5  3.5  3.8 
Interest+  admin.+ pensions  6.3  8.1  9.2  10.1 
(Interest+ admin.+ pensions)/Revenue  32.6  45.1  54.3  54.8 
Notes:         
1/ Revised estimates for the center and budget estimates for the states   
2/ Refers to Revenue expenditure in the budget        
3/ Refers to Capital outlay and net loans and advances from the center to the states 
Sources: GOI budget documents(2003/04 and various issues), RBI bulletins, CSO, Handbook of Statistics 
on Indian Economy 2001/02 (RBI), Staff estimates 
  
                                                      
12 RBI (2001a), Chapter XI Public Debt Management. 
13 RBI (2001b), Table 111. 
14 While 2002/03 shows a large revenue increase, it is based on the budget estimate for states, which tends to be 
optimistic.     7
Table 3 presents more detail on the fiscal adjustment during the Eighth and Ninth Plan 
periods.
15  The second column shows that, relative to the mid-1980s, the fall in revenues of 1.5 
percentage points of GDP and the rise in interest payments of 1.3 percentage points was 
neutralized by a cut in capital expenditures of offsetting magnitude.  The fall in revenues at a time 
of accelerating growth, especially of industry and manufacturing, the most tax-buoyant 
components of GDP, is attributable to the cuts in customs and excise duty rates undertaken as part 
of the reforms following the 1991 crisis.  The object of these cuts was to increase efficiency in 
production and trade, with the fall in indirect taxes to be recouped by improvements in direct tax 
collections, although the latter has not so far occurred.  
 
 
Table 3: Fiscal Adjustment Dynamics, 1985/86-2001/02 
(based on period averages) 
 
% of GDP  8








Revenues -1.5  -0.9 
Primary deficit  -3.2  +1.4 
Debt +8.0  +0.0 
Interest   +1.3  +0.7 
Capital expenditure  -2.8  -0.4 
Gross fiscal deficit  -1.8  +2.1 
 
 
The rise in interest payments was due a rise in average debt/GDP levels and a rise in 
average interest rates.  Controlling for the former, the rise in interest rates accounted for about 1 
of the 1.3 percentage points increase in interest payments.  We conservatively use 1 percentage 
point of GDP as an estimate of the loss of financial repression revenues as a result of introducing 
auctions for government securities in 1992/93, a general freeing up of deposit and lending rates 
and a large reduction in the cash reserve ratio and statutory liquidity ratio for banks.  Financial 
repression has historically played an important role in India’s public finances.  Giovannini and de 
Melo (1993) estimate that revenues from financial repression averaged 2.86 percent of GDP per 
year for the years 1980-85.
16  Using a similar methodology, Kletzer and Kohli (2001) estimate 
that financial repression revenues fell from an average of 6 percent of GDP over 1980-1990 to 2.9 
percent over 1992-98.  We do not intend to revisit these computations or address related 
methodological issues; based on the rise in interest payments during the Eighth Plan period, we 
suggest that easing financial repression “cost” the budget 1 percentage point of GDP.
17  Thus, the 
simple story of fiscal adjustment during the Eighth Plan period is that revenues fell by about 2.5 
percentage points of GDP as a result of tax reform and financial liberalization, and was 
compensated by cutting capital expenditure instead of finding alternative revenue sources as 
originally envisaged. 
 
                                                      
15 We omit the crisis year, 1990/91, and the year following it.  
16 Computed as the ex post differential between foreign and rupee interest rates times the amount of government debt 
held outside the central bank.  This calculation ignored the effect of tax concessions on government debt.  
17 The rise in interest rates during the Eighth Plan period might also reflect higher inflationary expectations following 
the devaluation of 1991; but only the liberalization of interest rates allowed this to be reflected in realized interest rates.  
Further, it would take a few years for the full  effect to feed through, until all the historically issued debt matured.   8
  Table 3 also shows that the revenue decline continued and interest payments rose further 
during the Ninth Plan period, “compensated” by additional cuts in capital expenditure.  Falling 
revenues account for 0.9 of the 1.4 percentage points of GDP rise in primary deficit relative to the 
Eighth Plan period.  As capital expenditure endured a further cut of 0.4 percentage points, it 
follows that the rise in non-interest current spending in the form of higher salaries, pensions and 
administrative costs accounted for about 1 percentage point of GDP.  This was probably driven 
by the Central Fifth Pay Commission award, the implementation of which began in 1997 at the 
center, followed the next year by the states.  
 
Summarizing, we can say that relative to the pre-crisis mid 1980s, tax and financial-
repression revenues fell by 2.5 percentage points of GDP during the 1990s as a result of needed 
reforms, offset by a compression in capital expenditure;
 18 while the Fifth Pay Commission award 
probably had a negative impact of about 1 percentage point of GDP.  The impact of the latter is 
expected to attenuate over time, because of the discrete nature of civil service wage increases.  
Moreover, the issue is not so much that the civil service is over-staffed or the wage bill excessive 
when scaled by population and GDP respectively, but more that there is a skills imbalance, with 
most of the employment concentrated in low-skill jobs, which pay considerably more than 
comparable jobs in the private sector; with fewer and probably under-paid staff at the higher 
skills level needed for efficient social service delivery.
19  Hence, reversing the fiscal slide needs 
to focus on mobilizing revenue and restoring government capital and development expenditure; 
cutting the wage bill is a secondary issue.     
 
2.3  Government Debt Dynamics 
The change over time in the general government debt-to-GDP ratio can be decomposed 
into two parts: the first attributable to the primary deficit/GDP ratio (pd); and the second, a term 
proportional to the difference between the real interest rate paid on government debt and the 
growth rate of real GDP, (r-g).  During financial repression, we would expect the rise in debt to 
be less than the primary deficit (as ratios of GDP), because interest rates are kept artificially low; 
but with financial liberalization, interest rates would tend to rise and might eventually exceed 
growth rates, putting government debt on a much faster upward trajectory.  We shall show that 
this is what happened during the Ninth Plan period.   
Figure 2 presents the primary deficit and the term proportional to (r-g) based on the 
standard difference equation for government debt shown in Annex 2.  It can be seen that after 
1994/95, the term proportional to (r-g) becomes smaller in magnitude and over the last four years, 
has been either positive or close to zero, no longer offering the offset to the primary deficit that it 








                                                      
18 While revenues fell and interest payments rose further during the Ninth Plan period, it is impossible to say what part 
of this is cyclical and what part due to reforms, so the 2.5 percentage points should be treated as a lower bound.  

















The implied value for (r-g) itself can be obtained through appropriate solution from the 
debt difference equation shown in Annex 2, and this is also plotted in Figure 2.
20  Implied (r-g) 
has charted an upward trend after 1994/95 and has been either close to zero or positive since 
1999/00, in spite of the record lows in interest rates over the last 18 months.  On average, the 
implied real interest rate was a substantial 6 percentage points below the growth rate during the 
Eighth Plan period and explains why the ratio of general government debt to GDP (GGD/GDP) 
fell in spite of primary deficits averaging over 2 percent of GDP.  But during the Ninth Plan 
period (i) the implied interest rate converged to or exceeded the growth rate, as anticipated in 
Serven (1996) and Reynolds (2001), while (ii) the primary deficit rose to an average of 3.5 
percent of GDP.  The combination of (i) and (ii) is by definition unsustainable without a fiscal 








                                                      
20 Lahiri and Kannan (2002)  directly calculate the interest rate as total interest payments divided by total debt, although 
strictly this should be augmented by a term capturing the exchange rate losses/gains on the external debt component of 
public debt.  To do the latter accurately, one would need detailed information on the currency composition of public 
debt.  We have calculated the effective rate of interest assuming that all external debt is dollar-denominated, and except 
for the years immediately before and after 1991, when the rupee depreciated significantly against the dollar, the implied 
interest rate tracks the directly calculated interest rate quite closely.  
























Box 1: Will Low Interest Rates Solve the Problem? 
Do the record lows in interest rates mean that the emphasis on unsustainable debt dynamics is misplaced?  
No, for the following reasons:   
 
•  Low interest rates stem not from better macroeconomic fundamentals but from weakness in the global economy 
and capital inflows.  To the extent that capital flows into India have been driven by one-off events since 
September 11, 2001 including fears of increased scrutiny of accounts held overseas as part of anti-money 
laundering drives or by the instability in Iraq more recently, it would be risky to slow fiscal reform on a gamble 
that such flows will continue indefinitely.  If capital flows subside and the global economy picks up, interest rates 
will once again be determined by medium-run inflationary expectations as molded by fiscal and macro 
fundamentals, which have weakened.   
•  Low interest rates for the government do not automatically mean low interest rates for the private sector, except 
for the best credits, as argued later in this paper. 
•  Low interest rates do not automatically improve debt dynamics.  In fact, the increase in GGD/GDP has accelerated 
from less than 2 percentage points of GDP per year over the first three years of the Ninth Plan period (1997/98 to 
1999/00) to over 4.5 percentage points of GDP per year over the last three years (2000/01 to 2002/03) 
notwithstanding the low interest rates.  Why?  First, primary deficits have gone up during the Ninth Plan period 
relative to the Eighth, increasing borrowing needs.  Second, what matters is the difference between interest rates 
and growth rates.  Slowing growth could offset the beneficial impact of lower interest rates.
21  Third, what matters 
for debt dynamics is the average cost of GGD.  Low interest rates at the margin obviously help, but will have to 
persist for sufficiently long (depending upon the inherited cost and maturity structure of the outstanding stock of 
GGD) to make a dent on the average rate.  On the other hand, since the low interest rates have resulted from low 
global inflation, domestic inflation has also come down with India’s increasing openness, which hurts to the extent 
that high nominal coupon debt has been issued in the past.
22  The net effect is therefore ambiguous: low marginal 
interest rates help, low inflation hurts.   
 
One “solution” that has been proposed is to engage in debt swaps in order to capitalize on the current low 
interest rates.  However, these have to be carefully approached.  To the extent that these are between the center and 
states, they will not affect the position of the general government unless the center can pre-pay the ultimate creditor 
without penalty; and to the extent that they are with banks, but not market-based (as for example in a scheme where the 
resulting capital gain is shared between banks and the government or fully captured by the government), they will 
weaken both the balance sheets of banks and erode their income with negative consequences down the road.  But 




  Another option is to prepay external debt.  The first two possibilities are to use divestment receipts or raise 
funds by borrowing in the domestic market to pay off external debt.  The two are equivalent.  If divestment receipts are 
used to prepay debt instead of financing the fiscal deficit then new borrowing would go up exactly by the amount of the 
divestment receipts.  Thus, prepayment is equivalent to replacing an external liability with a domestic one; it does not 
change the balance sheet of the government.  Interest payments will go down if the external debt carries a much higher 
interest rate (apart from posing exchange rate risk) than the new domestic borrowing.  However, engaging in such 
prepayment also has its limits.  Domestic financial institutions are already carrying some of the highest levels of 
government paper in the world relative to deposits and additional borrowing in the domestic market to pay off external 
debt means less funding for the private sector.  The third possibility is to borrow from the RBI which then uses its 
reserves to pay off debt.  This will improve the joint income position of the government and RBI (but not the joint 
balance sheet) if returns on reserves are lower than the rates paid on external debt.
24  Thus, while debt swaps and 
prepayment may lower interest payments at the margin, a more fundamental fiscal adjustment is needed.   
                                                      
21 But why doesn’t growth pick up with lower interest rates?  An answer is attempted below. 
22 Thus, RBI (2003a), page IV-20, notes that the average interest rate on new Central Government securities issued 
during the year reached a peak of 13.75 percent in 1995/96, declining gradually to 11.77 percent in 1999/00 and 9.44 
percent in 2001/02.  Even these latter rates are “high” relative to today’s inflation rates and growth. 
23 However, pre-paying debt now held by the NSSF that creates a wedge between its obligations and what it receives 
from the government will only create a contingent liability. 
24 It will also replenish RBI’s holdings of government securities, which have been depleted by the sterilization of 
capital inflows.  Of course to the extent this happens, it worsens the income position of RBI as foreign exchange 
reserves typically have lower returns than domestic government paper.   11
 
2.4 Quasi-Fiscal  Issues 
  In addition to the deterioration in “explicit” public finances, quasi-fiscal activities have 
become a growing threat since the mid-1990s.  These may be grouped into three categories: 
losses associated with off-budget activities, notably, supply of irrigation and power; contingent 
liabilities, which may either be explicit, e.g., guarantees of bonds issued by loss-making public 
enterprises; or implicit, e.g., financial sector bailout costs resulting from implicit deposit 
insurance; and unfunded pension liabilities.  These could be interrelated, e.g., the losses of State 
Electricity Boards (SEBs) may be financed by bonds issued with government guarantees. 
  SEB losses were estimated at Rs.332 billion in 2001/02, triple the level in 1996/97.
25  To 
put this in perspective, the gross fiscal deficit of the states was 4.4 percent of GDP in 2001/02, or 
about Rs.1183 billion, a number which included only a portion of the power sector loss, namely, 
Rs. 83 billion.  If the full amount of the loss were included, the fiscal deficits of the states would 
rise by an average of 30 percent.  Some states have started reporting their deficits with and 
without the loss of the respective SEB in recognition of the growing problem.   
 
If SEB losses are explicitly included in the general government deficit, these would 
increase by a significant 1.0-1.5 percentage points of GDP, i.e., the gross fiscal deficit would be 
11.5 percent of GDP instead of 10 percent.  Such inclusion appears to be only a matter of time - 
the Ahluwalia Committee
26 recommended replacing past-due arrears of SEBs to central 
government agencies by state government bonds, while the tripartite agreement signed in March 
2003 by RBI, state governments and Ministry of Power allows RBI to use amounts due to the 
states to settle any unpaid bills presented to the respective SEB by central agencies. 
 
Guarantees have risen sharply after 1996, mostly in connection with borrowings by SEBs 
and special purpose vehicles (SPVs) established for large irrigation projects.
27  CRISIL estimates 
that of the market borrowings by state-level entities guaranteed between 1995-2002, Rs.440 
billion will be called over the next five years.  While this may not seem much, this estimate 
excludes guaranteed loans from banks/FIs such as NABARD, HUDCO, LIC, NCDC, REC, 
public sector banks and regional rural banks.  Moreover, the guarantors themselves, i.e., the state 
governments, are already heavily indebted. 
 
  Financial sector bail-out costs have not so far been significant, unlike in East Asia and 
some of the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Since 1992/93, relatively small 
amounts of money have been spent to assist nationalized banks, regional rural banks, UTI, IDBI 
and IFCI, with another 0.8 percent of 2002/03 GDP identified to help UTI, IFCI and IDBI .  The 
banks’ reported gross non-performing loans (NPLs) were 10.4 percent of loans as of March 2002; 
net of provisions the figure was 5.5 percent; and net non-performing loans as a percent of assets 
were 2.3 percent or about 1.5 percent of GDP.  While some financial analysts have suggested that 
NPLs are substantially understated by various “evergreening” methods, a doubling of the gross 
figure would put NPLs at less than 7 percent of bank assets, or about 4.5 percent of GDP.   
Another indicator of risk, lending for stocks, real estate, and commodities, is less than 4 percent 
of lending.  While off-balance sheet operations are equal to nearly 60 percent of the balance 
sheet, three-fourths are forward exchange contracts (half by the foreign banks) mostly related to 
                                                      
25 Source: Planning Commission, Government of India: Annual Report (2001-02) on the Working of State Electricity 
Boards & Electricity Departments, May, 2002.  The actual financial loss is even greater because of collection 
problems. 
26 Report of the Expert Group, Settlement of SEB Dues, May 2001. 
27 CRISIL (2002).   12
exports and imports and often with RBI as the counter-party.
28  While these numbers are low in 
comparison with East Asia and China, this has to be looked at in the context of public sector debt 
that is over 90 percent of GDP in an environment of worsening government debt dynamics. 
Pension liabilities have been growing rapidly both at the center and states.  At the center, 
pension spending for civil servants grew by more than 20 percent per year during the 1990s, and 
has now reached 1 percent of GDP.  The situation is even more difficult at the state level.  For 
example, in Uttar Pradesh
29, the ratio of pension spending to state GDP increased from 0.4 
percent to 1.2 percent during the 1990s.  The White Paper on Tamilnadu Government’s Finances 
issued in 2001 (pages 19-20) notes that pension commitments “have been growing at an 
incredible rate of 30 percent per annum on an average during the last five years and constitute the 
fastest growing component of the total revenue expenditure of the State Government”.  Pensions 
as a percentage of revenue expenditure grew from 5 percent in 1991/92 to 13 percent in 2000/01.  
Pension expenditures at the central and state levels are likely to keep on growing at a fast pace, 
especially at the state level where employment more than doubled over the past 30 years.   
Preliminary estimates conducted in 2001 using the World Bank PROST actuarial model suggest 
that the present value of central and state pension liabilities could amount to 25 percent of GDP.
30  
3. Crisis  Proofing 
In spite of the rise in the level of government debt and the deterioration in its dynamics, 
India is not on the verge of a macroeconomic crisis such as that endured recently by Russia, 
Turkey and Argentina, which apparently exhibited better fiscal fundamentals on the eve of their 
crises than India has over the past few years.
 31 There are several reasons for this.  First, there is 
only limited capital account convertibility.  Second, cross-country comparisons are complicated 
by differences in the currency composition of debt, its maturity, whether or not the real exchange 
rate is in equilibrium and the size of contingent liabilities and potential balance sheet 
currency/maturity mismatches in the banking and corporate sectors.  In India, there has been a 
shift towards long-term rupee debt in financing the fiscal deficit after 1991, while strictures on 
external borrowing by corporates and banks automatically lower the potential for currency 
mismatches.  Third, in contrast to the recent crisis countries, India has an impeccable credit 
history (no defaults, no debt restructurings) and a track record of low inflation and high 
macroeconomic stability, which permits it to issue long-term debt denominated in its own 
currency, an option unavailable to countries such as Russia, Turkey and Argentina.
32  Fourth, 
countries with unsustainable public debt dynamics which eventually experienced crisis, such as 
Russia and Argentina, simultaneously had low international liquidity.  This combination proved 
intractable, even with substantial bailout packages.  In contrast, India’s international liquidity has 
improved substantially after 1991 as noted above. 
After the crisis, there was a conscious decision to build up reserves to “provide greater 
insurance against external sector stresses and uncertainties”.
33  Acharya (2001, page 17) notes that 
“the capital account surplus reached its peak in 1993/94 (at 3.5 percent of GDP) and has been 
well below that level in subsequent years.  Nevertheless, except for 1995/96, the capital account 
has been large enough in relation to the corresponding current account deficit in each of the last 
ten years (i.e., 1991/92-2000/01), to ensure accretion to foreign exchange reserves.” 
                                                      
28 While not a serious issue at present, this could potentially encumber RBI reserves and bears monitoring.  
29 See Zahir (2002) 
30 A detailed analysis of the pension liability is beyond the scope of this paper, although we flag it as an important 
unfunded liability.  See also World Bank (2003a). 
31 For the comparison of fundamentals, see IMF (2002), chapter III, page 37, and Ahluwalia (2002a). 
32 These factors, together with the degree of dollarization have been stressed as critical factors in determining default 
risk in Rogoff, Reinhart and Savastano (2003).  
33 Acharya (2001), page 16.   13
Reddy (2002, page 1913) notes that “….two factors are responsible for significant 
addition to reserves in the recent past viz, a far lower level of current account deficit (CAD) than 
the expected sustainable level of about 2 percent of Gross Domestic product (GDP) each year and 
a continued inflow of capital…”.   
Table 4 confirms that the reserve increase was driven by the fall in the current account 
deficit after the 1991 crisis; the surplus on the capital account is more or less constant except for a 
small, apparently temporary increase during the Eighth Plan period. It divides the post-crisis 
reserve accumulation into three phases.  The first is the Eighth Plan period, during which fiscal 
and current account deficits fell, while private investment rose from a rate of 13 percent of GDP 
during the second half of the 1980s to over 15 percent.  The second is the Ninth Plan period, 
when fiscal deficits jumped upward, but the current account deficit fell further and reserve 
accumulation accelerated.  Private investment rose slightly.  The third phase is post-April 2002, 
when reserves have boomed and a small current account surplus has appeared.   
 
Table 4: Stages in Reserve Accumulation 
 














































Current account balance 
2/ -2.2  -1.2  -0.7  0.7 
Capital account balance 
debt-creating 














Increase in reserves ($ bn.)  -2.6  17  28  21 
     Notes: 
      
1/ : Adjusted for errors and omissions.  Hence, the components do not sum to total investment. 
    2/ : There are differences in estimation of CAB as per the National Accounts and the RBI. Thus the         
numbers do not yield the identity CAB = national savings minus investment. 
Source : National Accounts 2002 and various issues, Reserve Bank of India Bulletins. 
 
The fact that private investment grew by much less than private saving during the Ninth Plan 
relative to the Eighth has been used to argue that the rising fiscal deficit absorbed part of the 
increase in private savings and to this extent crowded out private investment, thereby helping to 
keep the current account deficit in check.
34  We return to this point later in the paper. 
The acceleration in reserve accumulation during 2002/03 and after raises two questions: 
(i) what is driving it?  and (ii) how to manage the macroeconomic consequences.  About 40 
percent of the reserve increase during 2002/03 happened after November 2002.  An unknown part 
of this might have been driven by capital inflows related to fears of the Iraq war, and therefore, 
this pace of accretion might not be maintained.
35 Another possibility is we are seeing capital 
                                                      
34 Ahluwalia (2002), Acharya (2001) and IMF (2002). 
35 See RBI (2003b) and Kapur and Patel (2003).  Reddy (2002) contains a comprehensive account of foreign exchange 
reserves policy through the 1990s.   14
reflows from overseas as a result of the instability in the Middle East and money attracted by the 
rupee-dollar interest differential given expectations about the exchange rate.  Whatever the 
reason, we show next that the reserve build-up has improved liquidity, but not solvency.    
The high reserves have not strengthened the joint balance sheet of the general 
government and RBI because the RBI has been sterilizing the capital inflows to keep inflation 
low.  Let δ  denote the consolidated liabilities of the general government and RBI, which we call 
net public debt, d general government debt, f RBI’s net foreign assets and c its net domestic 
assets, all expressed as ratios to GDP.  By definition, δ  is given by:
36 
 (1)  , t t t t c f d − − = δ  
where t denotes time.  Now consider a situation where increases in reserves are sterilized by RBI 
sales of government securities, i.e., reductions in its net domestic assets, c, so that . c f ∆ − = ∆
37  It 
then follows from (1) that: 
 (2)  , d ∆ = ∆δ  
i.e., the trajectory of net public debt and general government debt should be expected to be the 
same.  In other words, while growing foreign exchange reserves boost international liquidity, they 
do not strengthen the combined balance sheet of the government and RBI.  Essentially, domestic 
debt is being issued to finance the deficit and buy reserves.
38  Table 5 brings this out clearly.  We 
see that net public debt increased by 23 percentage points of GDP between 1996/97 and 2002/03; 
from Table 1, general government debt increased by 20 percentage points of GDP over the same 
period.  We also see  that between 1997/98 and 2001/02, the sum of net foreign assets and net 
domestic assets (“base money”) fluctuated in a small range of about 13.5-14 percent of GDP, but 
fell sharply in 2002/03.  This is consistent with a policy of sterilization to keep inflation low, with 
the fall in base money in 2002/03 attributable to the appreciation of the rupee.
39  
 
Table 5 : Net Public Debt (End March) 
 90/91  96/97  97/98  98/99  99/00  00/01  01/02  02/03 
   Crisis               
General govt debt (Rs. billion)  4121  8913  10127  11655  13669  15862  18323  20810 
 (-)  Net foreign exchange assets of RBI     80  948   1159   1380  1659  1972   2640   3582 
(-)   Net domestic assets of RBI   682  952   1001   1042   933    878    569   -529 
(+) Net non-monetary liabilities of RBI   270  352    433    605   702    793   1012   1265 
Net public debt   3630  7364   8400   9839  11779  13806  16127  19022 
Memo : % GDP                
Net foreign exchange assets of RBI   1.4  6.9    7.6    7.9   8.6   9.4  11.5  14.6 
Net domestic assets of RBI  12.0  7.0    6.6    6.0   4.8   4.2    2.5  -2.2 
Net public debt   63.8  53.8  55.2  56.5  60.8  65.6  70.2  77.6 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Monthly Bulletins                
 
 
                                                      
36 The definition of net public debt also includes some other terms on RBI’s balance sheet, as shown in Table 5, which 
we ignore here for simplicity. 
37 Strictly speaking, this holds approximately because net foreign assets and net domestic assets are both expressed as 
shares of GDP. 
38 Another way of making this point is to say that genuine assets can be created only by saving, not borrowing. To 
quote Flood and Jeanne (2000) “…reserves are expensive window dressing…by accumulating them the government 
behaves as an insolvent household that would try to impress creditors by financing large cash balances with credit card 
debt”.   
39 That is, RBI was exchanging an appreciating asset (rupee government securities) for a depreciating one (dollars) with 
a lower nominal coupon. For an analysis of sterilization and its effects, see Lal, Bery and Pant (2003).   15
4.  Macro Policy and Growth 
 
The policy of accumulating reserves while keeping inflation low in the face of rapidly 
deteriorating public finances suggests that India has had its own macroeconomic policy trilemma 
after 1997/98, seemingly opting to choose the first two out of the following three objectives:
40 
 
1.  Keep inflation at single-digit levels 
2.  Minimize vulnerability to external crisis by accumulating reserves 
3.  Maximize long-run growth and poverty reduction. 
 
Objectives 1 and 2 seem to have been pursued at the expense of 3.  Given the positive link 
between growth and income poverty reduction in India (World Bank 2003), a reconfiguration of 
fiscal policies that promotes growth would speed poverty reduction while also improving debt 
dynamics.  We pursue the fiscal policy-growth link by asking two questions: will India grow out 
of its debt problem, or does it need a fiscal adjustment to achieve satisfactory growth in the first 
place? And what has been the impact of macro policy on private investment?  To anticipate a 
later section, we also note that unlike the trilemma in Obstfeld and Taylor (1998), the above is not 
a true trilemma, in that a fiscal adjustment which reduced deficits and improved the composition 
of government spending would permit all three objectives to be attained.   
 
4.1  A Growth Crisis? 
 
It was argued above that notwithstanding the record lows in interest rates, a fiscal 
correction would be needed to place government debt on a sustainable path.  The Tenth Plan 
document sheds more light on this topic.  Chapter 2 of the plan document notes that in order to 
meet the growth target of 8 percent per year the investment rate will need to rise by 4 percentage 
points to a little over to 28 percent, with the increment in domestic savings contributing 3.5 
percentage points and the rise in the current account deficit (CAD) the balance of 0.5 percentage 
points. The ICOR is assumed to fall from 4.5 to 3.6, investments to grow at 14 percent per annum 
compared to the long-run growth rate of 6.5 percent, and consumption by 6.9 percent per annum.  
The chapter notes that private household savings rose over the Eighth and Ninth plans in response 
to the cut in tax rates and consequent rise in disposable income.  This could slow down in the 
Tenth plan period because of the need to raise the tax/GDP ratio, and highlights the need to 
increase public savings from -1.7 percent in the base year of the Tenth plan (2001/02) to +2.1 
percent in its last year (2006/07).  Unless this happens, the plan document is quite specific that 
the growth target is unlikely to be reached.  It also cautions that the CAD should not be used to 
slacken the public savings target, and that a safe upper limit is 3 percent of GDP. 
 
The plan document then compares the fiscal deficits projected under the above savings-
investment scenario (the “desirable deficit” from the perspective of attaining a compound average 
growth rate of 8 percent during the Tenth Plan period) with the fiscal deficit that would achieve 
sustainability, defined as a stabilization of the government debt/GDP ratio at the base year 
(2001/02) level.  The comparison is summarized in Table 6. 
                                                      
40 The trilemma in Obstfeld and Taylor (1998) notes that only two out of the following three goals can be selected for 
an open economy: (i) use exchange rate as an instrument for price stability; (ii) keep capital account open for efficiency 
and flexibility; and (iii) pursue an activist monetary (interest rate) policy.   16
 
Comparing columns (1) and (3) indicates the sizable fiscal correction needed at the level of the 
states to achieve sustainability even if the assumed growth of 8 percent were to materialize.  
Comparing columns (2) and (3) shows that an even bigger fiscal correction is needed to generate 
the needed public savings for investment compatible with 8 percent growth in the first place.  It 
follows that a fiscal adjustment is needed to generate the investment needed for growth which 
will then lead to debt sustainability: India is not going to grow out of its debt problem without a 
fiscal adjustment.   
4.2  Impact on Private Investment 
Notwithstanding the boom in private investment after the 1991 crisis and the pick up in 
growth during the Eighth Plan period, growth slowed to 5.8 percent over 1997-98 to 2000-01.
41  
Overall, growth in the 1990s was similar to that in the 1980s, the attainment of a trend rate of 
growth of about 6 percent.  What will push the trend rate of growth to 8 percent?  The Tenth Plan 
document notes that more public saving and investment and hence a fiscal adjustment are part of 
the answer, because of the direct benefits (more infrastructure) and the spin-offs (banks having 
more incentive to lend to the private sector, a less uncertain macroeconomic environment).   
Structural reforms will also help, especially addressing impediments such as small-scale industry 
reservations and labor regulations.
 42  Similarly, creating a more conducive environment for 
private investment will also be helpful in the more competitive environment in which Indian 
firms find themselves today. 
 
In this context, one must ask if private investment has been crowded out by the macro 
policy stance.
 43  This is difficult to prove conclusively because the rise in the private savings-
investment gap noted above (Table 4) may also have come about as the result of a needed period 
of consolidation following the private investment boom during the Eighth Plan period.  But there 
is substantial evidence to suggest that the macro policy stance has not been the most conducive to 
promoting private investment. 
                                                      
41 There is some controversy about how much even of this lower growth was artificially boosted by the Fifth Pay 
Commission (FPC) Award.  Acharya (2001) contends that suitably adjusting  real value-added in the category “Public 
Administration and Defence” would lower growth to 5.4 percent.  RBI (2003a) finds a minimal impact of the FPC 
award. 
42 For a detailed discussion of structural reform issues, see World Bank (2003a). 
43 World Bank (2000) and Reynolds (2001) document a negative association between fiscal deficits and private 
investment, although establishing causality from high deficits to low private investment is a different matter.    
 
Desirable Deficit 
2/                     
(2)
Base year     
(3)
g=6.5  g=8.0
Combined  7.4  8.6 6.8 9.3
Center  4.4  5.2 3.6 4.9
States  3.0  3.4 3.2 4.5
Source: Tenth Five Year Plan, GoI 
Sustainable Deficit 
1/                         
(1) 
Table 6: Sustainable and Desirable Deficits In The 10th Plan Context 
Notes:  
1/   Table 2.21 of Tenth Plan 
                  2/   Table 2.22 of Tenth Plan   17
First, the crowding out of government investment by rising revenue deficits potentially  
hurts private investment.  For example, an empirical study in RBI (2002c) concludes that public 
investment in infrastructure has strong positive complementarities with private investment.   
Second, the desire to build up reserves while sterilizing capital inflows to keep inflation 
low means higher real interest rates the higher the fiscal deficit and government debt, especially 
in an economy with capital controls.  In fact, real interest rates for borrowers rose with growing 
government debt and remained high between 1996/97 and 2001/02, averaging over 12 percent per 
annum as shown in Figure 3 based on Table 1 in Mohan (2003).  Thus, it does appear that a 
“loose fiscal-tight money” policy mix emerged during the Ninth Plan period to help meet reserve 





















Third, over the last two years or so, interest rates have fallen in India in line with global 
trends; but there are significant barriers to translating the low marginal interest rates on 
government debt into low lending rates to the real sector. The Indian financial system is 
segmented and must conform to various minimum lending and portfolio composition 
requirements.  For example, the prime lending rate tends to be kept high because it cannot be 
exceeded when lending to the priority small scale sector, which might partly be motivated by the 
inefficient policy of small-scale reservations.  Insurance companies must hold at least 50 percent 
of their assets in government debt and provident funds at least 50 percent in central government 
debt and 25 percent in state government debt.  Provident funds have also purchased debt of 
“special purpose vehicles” (SPVs) guaranteed by the state governments.  Annual inflows into 
small (postal) savings, which compete with banks for deposits, are invested wholly in government 
debt.  These have grown from an average of 7.9 percent of GDP in the Eighth Plan to nearly 10 
percent currently and consume nearly the whole increase in net household financial saving.  The 
administratively-determined interest rates for these instruments were set artificially high, at 10.5-
13 percent until 2000 and are still 7.5-9 percent, with tax concessions.  This worsens public debt 
dynamics while raising the cost of funds for banks and hence lending rates to the private sector.  
Moreover, banks are under pressure to reduce their non-performing assets, which attracts them 
even more toward holding government debt.  And non-bank financial corporations
44 (NBFCs), 
                                                      
44 See Bossone and Zahir (1999) 
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which held little government debt and funded riskier firms, represented an average of 7.7 percent 
of GDP during the Eighth Plan period but only 1.1 percent during the Ninth.  Their decline 
probably contributed to the rapid growth in bank deposits after 1996.  Therefore dominant 
government ownership of the financial sector, the portfolio problems of banks, the investment 
rules for insurance and PFs, and interest rates on small savings all create a natural proclivity 
towards lending to the government.  This is reinforced by the incentive structure in banks, 
whereby managers complain of being subject to criminal investigation if a loan to a private 
enterprise goes sour.  All this could prevent low interest rates for the government from 
automatically translating into low rates for the private sector, except for the best credits
45.  
 
Fourth, recent work presented in Aizenman (2003) suggests that unless fiscal reforms are 
introduced to compensate for the loss of implicit revenues from financial repression, financial 
reforms may not yield the intended benefits in terms of more efficient resource allocation.
46  
Instead, a growing proportion of bank assets may be invested in government debt.  As of March 
2002, about 28 percent of bank assets were invested in government debt and another 5.6 percent 
was with the RBI.  Indian banks have one of the highest ratios of government debt to deposits in 
the world, similar to Latin American countries and much higher than most East Asian 
comparators, even after the crisis.  A fiscal adjustment would clearly give banks more incentive 
to lend to the private sector.   
5.  Fiscal Reform Priorities 
Based on the preceding analysis, the two priorities are to complete tax reform in order to 
mobilize more revenue; and improve the composition of general government expenditure.   
Neither will be easy or quick.   
Chapter 2 of the Tenth Plan document sets a goal of raising central government gross tax 
revenue from 8.6 percent in 2001/02 to 10.3 percent of GDP by the end of the Tenth Plan, 
essentially returning to the level of 1991/92.  Plan projections assume an increase in tax buoyancy 
from 0.8 during the Ninth Plan to 1.26 during the Tenth.  Most of this is expected to come from 
indirect taxes, customs duty in particular.  Achieving this goal assumes a withdrawal of import 
tariff exemptions (except on strategic imports); a strong resumption of manufacturing sector 
growth, as this sector has the highest tax buoyancy; and extending the tax net to include the 
booming services sector.   The states’ own tax collection is projected to rise from 5.9 percent of 
GDP in the base year to 6.6 percent by the end of the Tenth Plan; this crucially rests on the 
implementation of a unified VAT covering all goods and services.  In like vein, the Kelkar 
Committee reports
47 emphasize the completion of tax reform by eliminating exemptions, the 
bringing into the tax net of services and agriculture and improved information technology-based 
tax administration.  Although tax administration was given due prominence in the Union Budget 
for 2003/04, there has been a tendency to increase exemptions and special rates, even in excise 
despite the rationalization of main rates; and there has been no move to tax agricultural income, 
which will perpetuate incentives to disguise non-agricultural income as agricultural income. 
Given the fiscal constraints identified above, one way to increase capital and 
developmental expenditure is to re-direct spending away from subsidies.  These have three main 
components: (i) food and fertilizer subsidies, which amounted to a total of 1.4% of GDP in 
                                                      
45 See Hanson (2002). 
46 Aizenman’s (2003) argument is that financial reforms may be forced by greater trade integration because the latter 
enables domestic residents to escape financial repression through capital flight facilitated by export and import under- 
and over-invoicing.  This makes financial repression more costly as a tax and therefore leads to financial reform; but 
fiscal reforms are needed to compensate for the implicit revenue loss.  Patnaik and Vasudevan (no date) discuss capital 
flight from India through trade misinvoicing during the 1990s. 
47 Report of the Task Force on Direct Taxes, Report of the Task Force on Indirect Taxes, MOF, December 2002.   19
2002/03; (ii) a petroleum subsidy of 0.4 percent of GDP; and (iii) a power subsidy of 1.5 percent 
of GDP of which about 0.5 percent is explicitly included in state government budgets and the 
balance is an implicit subsidy. 
Foodgrain and input subsidies have distorted farmer cropping and investment decisions 
and thereby contributed to natural resource degradation (soil nutrient imbalances, water logging, 
salinity, etc.).  At the same time, public investments in agriculture over the last decade have 
declined in large part because of the need to finance subsidies in the foodgrain, fertilizer, 
irrigation, and power sectors.  Therefore, a  shift in central expenditures from food (subject to the 
maintenance of a minimum social safety net) and fertilizer subsidies towards productivity-
enhancing investments, including irrigation, rural infrastructure, and research and extension, 
would give the agricultural sector and off-farm employment a much-needed boost.
48   
The petroleum subsidy is to be phased out over the medium term.  The power subsidy is 
much more difficult politically, even though it is regressive and the poor benefit little from 
subsidized electricity.
 49  Tariffs covered only 68% of the cost of supply in 2001/02.  At the same 
time, there is high dispersion in tariffs, with commercial and industrial users cross-subsidizing 
agricultural and domestic consumers and being charged rates far in excess of the cost of supply.  
As a result of this and the poor quality of supply, many manufacturing companies install their 
own generators.   
The financial and social case for power sector reform is clear, as are the essential 
elements.  Average tariffs need to be raised to reflect cost of supply; universal metering of 
consumption is required, especially for agricultural and domestic consumers; payments discipline 
needs to be enforced; and a targeted subsidy scheme needs to be introduced for poor households 
and farmers so that the cross-subsidy burden on industrial and commercial users can be 
eliminated.  GoI has recently initiated a few potentially decisive steps to give states stronger 
reform incentives.
50  For these to work, privatization of distribution, stronger action on tariffs, 
governance improvement and financial restructuring are needed.  
On guarantees, there are two issues: what to do about the existing stock; and how to 
minimize or stop the new flow altogether.  On the first, one idea is to create a guarantee 
redemption fund,
51 though the question is how this will be funded given fiscal constraints.   
Besides, it will work only in conjunction with a correction of the fundamental problems in power 
and irrigation – especially tariff setting – which is also needed to stop the flow of new guarantees 
which would otherwise be needed for fresh borrowings to finance continued losses.  
An important spin-off from fiscal reform will be to enhance the role of the financial 
sector in efficient resource allocation
52 and thereby reap the benefits associated with a more 
liberalized financial system.  Another challenge is to minimize financial sector risks and thereby 
the build up of contingent fiscal liabilities.  In this connection, the new Securitisation and 
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Bill (2002), which 
allows banks to take over collateral more easily, could push debtors to pay up.   Similarly, 
establishment of Credit Information Bureaus should help in sharing information on credit risk, 
which would lower transactions costs while also helping to control NPLs.  It would particularly 
                                                      
48 Deininger and Deininger (2001) and the forthcoming paper on ‘Targeted Public Distribution System: Is it Reaching 
the Poor?” 
49 World Bank (2001b) and (2002b).   
50 Parliament passed a new Electricity Act in 2003 and the Ministry of Finance launched the Accelerated Power 
Development and Reform Program.  For more details, see World Bank (2003a). 
51 RBI (2003e) 
52 See for example the analysis in Bossone, Mahajan and Zahir (2003) which explores through a choice theoretic model 
how changes in financial infrastructure affect the investors’ resource allocation decisions and also tests empirically the 
hypothesis with cross-country regressions.   20
help with SMEs, which at present suffer from very high real lending rates owing to the perception 
of high risk, as noted in Mohan (2003).  One topic that is relevant at present is interest rate risk.  
Financial institutions which have invested in long-term government paper have been making 
large trading profits as interest rates continued to fall, but now face risks from the possibility of 
rising interest rates.  In an attempt to counteract this, RBI has issued a directive on creating an 
Investment Fluctuation Reserve.  While banking regulation has improved, some of this has been 
offset by easing regulations to encourage restructurings and lending for housing and 
infrastructure, which is beset by a weak framework for user charges.  
Insurance and provident funds are heavily invested in government debt, and will face 
losses as interest rates rise.  Moreover, state provident funds have also invested in special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs) guaranteed by the state.  Many of these assets are no longer earning interest, 
making the performance of the state provident funds even more dependent on debt servicing by 
cash starved States, now that the guarantees are beginning to be called.  The ability of these 
provident funds to meet their obligations is likely to affect public confidence in government debt 
issues more broadly.  Finally, the administratively set returns on the provident funds are 
significantly above market rates, which encourage the management to engage in risky 
investments in the non-regulated portion of their portfolio and, more generally, create a potential 
contingent liability for the central and state governments along the lines of UTI.  Linking rates on 
the provident fund more closely to the market, and reducing the role of administratively fixed 
rates, would help control the continued build-up of these problems.  A similar link to rates on 
small savings would save interest costs for states. 
A last point is on institutions for fiscal management.  The Fiscal Responsibility and 
Budget Management Act passed by the Parliament  in 2003 mandates the central government to 
eliminate its revenue deficit by March 31, 2008.  A few states
53 have passed similar acts and 
others are in the process of formulating these.  In addition to revenue mobilization and subsidy 
reform, making this mandate credible would require strengthening the institutional framework, 
such as reforming the borrowing regime for states, expanding the volume of center-to-state 
transfers linked to reform and performance (such as the Fiscal Reforms Facility and the 
Accelerated Power  Development Reform Program) and measures to simplify expenditure 
management, including addressing what is widely regarded as an unhelpful division of budgetary 
resources into “plan” and “non-plan”, and rationalizing the management of Centrally Sponsored 
Schemes.
54  
6.  Debt and Deficit Projections to 2006/07 
  General government debt and deficits are projected to the end of the Tenth Plan period, 
2006/07, under two scenarios: a base case with no reform; and a reform case.  The reform case is 
driven by priorities emerging from the above analysis and centers around revenue mobilization, 
the re-focusing of a part of food and fertilizer subsidies toward rural infrastructure and the 
elimination of power sector losses.
55   
 
Box 2 summarizes the assumptions underpinning the two scenarios.  The reform scenario 
also assumes that the fiscal reforms are supplemented with structural reforms to spur growth.
56  
Debt projections are based on Annex 2, equation (1).  
                                                      
53 States like Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Punjab. 
54 For details, see World Bank (2003) pages 27-28. 
55 As Mihir Rakshit has noted in comments, these reforms do not derive from an optimal fiscal program.  In particular, 
no change in monetary policy is assumed, for example, a discontinuation of the sterilization of capital inflows which 
could increase seignorage by enlarging the monetary base.  See also Rakshit (2000).  Nevertheless, the projections here 
show that a small set of well-defined reforms can have a major positive impact by the end of the Tenth Plan period.   
56 For a detailed discussion of structural reforms, see World Bank (2003).   21
 
 
Box 2: Assumptions Underlying Debt/Deficit Projections 
The initial level of general government debt is 86 percent of GDP, its level at the end of 2002/03 plus 0.8 percent of 
GDP proposed for bailouts in connection with UTI, IDBI and IFCI.  
  
The primary deficit of the general government stays at 3.5 percent of GDP in the base case, a little below its average 
level over the past six years.
57  In the reform scenario, the primary deficit goes down linearly from 3.5 percent of GDP 
to 0.2 percent by the last year.  This comes from raising central government revenue by 1.7 percentage points and state 
revenues by 0.7 percentage points by the terminal year; eliminating the petroleum subsidy of 0.4 percent of GDP; and 
eliminating the portion of the power subsidy already included in the state government budgets (0.5 percent of GDP out 
of a total of 1.5 percent of GDP, see below).  It is assumed that taxes rise as a result of eliminating exemptions, 
widening the tax net to include services and implementing the state VAT. 
 
Food and fertilizer subsidies amount to about 1.4 percent of GDP.  Under reforms, 0.5 percent of GDP is maintained 
as a minimum social safety net; the balance of 0.9 percent is phased out while productivity-enhancing investments in 
agriculture, such as rural infrastructure and agricultural R&E, increase by the same amount.  There is no change in the 
base case. 
 
SEB losses (portion not included in budget) remain 1 percent of GDP in the base case and go linearly to zero by the 
terminal year as a result of aggressive power sector reforms in the reform scenario.   
 
Divestment receipts remain 0.5 percent of GDP in both scenarios. 
 
Guarantees (contingent liabilities, CL) accumulated as of end 2002/03 devolve at the rate of 1 percent of GDP per year 
in both scenarios. 
 
Growth, real interest rates and inflation based on the GDP deflator (percent) are as follows
58: 
 
   2003/04   2004/05   2005/06   2006/07 
Growth (base)
59       5.5       5.0       5.0       5.0 
Growth (reform)       5.5       7.0       7.5       8.0 
Real interest rate (both)     6.3       6.2       6.3       6.4 
Inflation  (both)       2.0       2.0       2.0       2.0 
 
A comment is in order on the real interest projection, which is common to both scenarios.  The 
real interest rate which emerges will depend upon the nominal interest rate and inflation.  The 
nominal interest rate will be determined by a weighted average of the interest rate on the pre-
existing debt stock and that on new borrowings. The implied nominal interest rate paid by the 
government was 8.6 percent in 2002/03.
60  We assume that the marginal nominal interest rates are 
7, 8, 9 and 9 percent respectively for the remaining four years of the Tenth Plan period and that 
15 percent of the debt stock matures every year.  Given the strong influence of the global interest 
rate cycle on Indian interest rates, there is no good reason to assume that one scenario will have 
dramatically different interest rates from the other over the next few years; further, the higher 
demand on the credit market for financing the much larger deficit in the base case will be offset to 
some extent by rising private credit demand in the reforms case as growth picks up.  Similarly, 
                                                      
57 The primary deficit incorporates seigniorage in the form of RBI profits and dividends, which enter non-tax revenue. 
58 The 8 percent Tenth Plan target would imply a growth rate of 8.9 percent per year over the remaining years of the 
Tenth Plan period, which seems unattainable at this point.  The base case assumes a compound average growth rate of 5 
percent during the Tenth Plan period and the reform scenario, 6.5 percent, reaching 8 percent in the terminal year. 
59 We also report results with a 6.5 percent growth rate assumption for 2003/04, given the present upbeat mood. 
60 This is obtained by adding the real growth rate to the implied difference between the real interest rate and growth rate 
shown in Figure 2 and then inflating by the implicit GDP deflator for 2002/03.   22
the inflation environment is likely to be benign, and we assume that the implicit GDP deflator is 2 
percent every year.
61   
    The debt/GDP trajectories under the two scenarios are presented in Figure 4.  In the base 
case, the general government debt/GDP ratio reaches 110 percent by the end of the
 Tenth Plan 
period.  In the reforms scenario, it reaches 92.5 percent after peaking at 93 percent in 2005/06.  
These results are being driven by the general government primary deficit, SEB losses and the 
calling of guarantees, and underline the need for implementing fiscal and structural reforms.  The 
broken lines are debt/GDP excluding contingent liabilities, (CL=0), which would lower the 





















Annex 3 summarizes the methodology used to project the general government gross 
fiscal deficit.  The results are shown in Figure 5. For this exercise, the calling of guarantees is 
ignored in projecting debt  and hence interest payments (CL=0).  While the uncovered portion of 
SEB losses (the part not explicitly included in state government budgets, see Box 2) is factored 
into the projection of debt levels and hence interest payments, they are not included in Figure 5 
for comparability with present deficit reporting practices; thus, the “true” picture especially in the 








                                                      
61 The scenarios presented in World Bank (2003) assumed that the convergence of real interest rates to the growth rate 
observed after 1997/98 would hold over the rest of the Tenth Plan period, and further, focused on CPI inflation rather 
than that measured by the implicit GDP deflator.  The net effect is that projected nominal interest rates and therefore 
fiscal deficits are much higher than those reported here, especially under reforms. 
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In the base case, deficits rise to 11.4 percent of GDP by 2006/07.  Under reforms, deficits fall 
steadily to just over 7 percent of GDP.  While there is not much difference in interest payments 
between the two scenarios initially, (because of the high level of initial debt, the absence of 
primary fiscal surpluses even in the reform scenario and similar levels of nominal interest rates), a 
substantial difference emerges by 2006/07.  Moreover, the reform scenario permits 0.9 percentage 
points of GDP more of capital and developmental expenditure by the 2006/07 as a result of 
refocusing subsidies towards rural infrastructure and agricultural R&E; and subsidies are reduced 
to a minimum food social safety net of 0.5 percent of GDP under reforms compared to 2.3 
percentage points in the base case. 
  Given the upbeat mood about growth for 2003/04, we also ran a base case with a growth 
rate of 6.5 percent for 2003/04, with the other rates unchanged, i.e., there is a rebound from the 
low growth of 2002/03 but the trend rate does not rise.  This has only a marginal impact: the 
debt/GDP ratio is 1 percentage point lower by 2006/07 and the fiscal deficit drops to 11.3 percent 
of GDP compared to 11.4 percent otherwise.  This underlines that one year of good growth is not 
going to alleviate the fiscal situation and that a sustained effort is unavoidable.
62 
What happens to revenue deficits? Under reforms, the increase in revenues (+2.4 
percentage points of GDP), elimination of petroleum subsidy plus the portion of SEB losses 
already incorporated in state budgets (0.9 percentage points) and refocusing part of food and 
fertilizer subsidies towards capital spending (0.9 percentage points) act to reduce the general 
government revenue deficit by about 4.2 percentage points of GDP by 2006/07.  Interest 
payments rise slightly, from 6.6 percent of GDP in the base year to about 7 percent of GDP by 
2006/07.  Thus, the net reduction in the revenue deficit will be close to 4 percentage points of 
GDP, not enough to eliminate it but reducing it to about 2 percent of GDP compared to current 
levels of over 6 percent.  Without reform, the debt burden and ratio of interest payments to 
revenue will become unmanageable and revenue deficits will rise further.  This is likely to fuel 
inflationary expectations and raise interest rates.  This will in turn dampen investment and lead to 
anemic growth.  
                                                      
62 We are grateful to Suresh Tendulkar for making this point. 
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7. Concluding  Remarks 
We have presented evidence showing that public finance fundamentals have deteriorated 
after 1997/98 even when compared to the period that preceded the 1991 fiscal-BoP crisis.  The 
recent record lows in interest rates have not softened this deterioration because of slowing growth 
and because public debt dynamics are driven by the average cost of the whole stock of debt, not 
just the marginal cost of new borrowings.  Moreover, while low interest rates help at the margin, 
the low inflation environment that produced them hurts to the extent that high nominal interest 
rates on dated securities were contracted in past years.  
 
While much of the recent emphasis in explaining the fiscal deterioration has been on the 
Fifth Pay Commission award, the elimination of financial repression and incomplete tax reforms 
have “cost” the exchequer a minimum of 2.5 percentage points of GDP over the 1990s. The thrust 
of the fiscal response so far has been to contain the gross fiscal deficit in the 10-11 percent of 
GDP range by cutting capital and development expenditure.  This is a sub-optimal response from 
the perspective of long-run growth and poverty reduction.  Against this background, the desire to 
crisis-proof by building up reserves and keep inflation low by targeting base money instead of 
making a fiscal adjustment has led to the emergence of a “loose fiscal-tight money” policy mix 
after 1997/98.  This has also meant that the benefits from financial sector liberalization have not 
been forthcoming.  Banks would naturally prefer to lend to the government at market-determined 
rates than make “risky” loans to the private sector.
63  If India is to reap the benefits associated 
with greater financial liberalization, there must be a fiscal adjustment focused in the first instance 
on revenue mobilization and tax reform to compensate for the loss of revenues from financial 
repression and customs duties in order to lower the supply of government debt and create more 
space for the private sector.  At the same time, power sector losses and guarantees extended by 
state governments for bonds issued by loss-making public enterprises have become a significant 
threat to state government finances.  Moreover, the decline in interest rates over the past 18 
months or so is unlikely to survive a recovery in the global economy.  Therefore, a program of 
robust fiscal reform is needed to combat unsustainable public debt dynamics and help India 
achieve its long-run growth and poverty reduction targets. 
 
To urge a phased “fiscal adjustment now”, the paper presents debt projections under a 
base case with no reform, and an alternative reform case focusing on a small set of well-defined 
reforms.  In the base case, the debt and interest burdens become unmanageable by the end of the 
Tenth Plan period, while under reform, deficits come down and the composition of spending 
greatly improves.  
In conclusion, the paper has argued that India is unlikely to grow out of its debt problem 
in spite of today’s low interest rates.  To the contrary, a fiscal adjustment is needed to underpin 
faster growth.  Even though it is difficult to develop the political momentum for reform in the 
absence of an impending crisis, the government has clearly recognized the need for fiscal 
adjustment through various initiatives and policy pronouncements.  The challenge is to translate 
these concerns into a road map for fiscal adjustment.  Doing so will create a better investment 
climate and help promote long-run growth and poverty reduction at the accelerated pace 
envisaged in the Tenth Plan document.  
                                                      
63 Leading, in the memorable words of the Deputy Governor of the RBI to the advent of “lazy banking”.   25
Annex 1: Background 
 
 
India’s 1991 BoP Crisis  
  
In 1991, India experienced a balance-of-payments (BoP) crisis which pushed it to the 
verge of default on its external debt.
64  The crisis followed an acceleration in growth to 6 percent 
in the second half of the 1980s; but fiscal deficits bordering on 10 percent of GDP during this 
period fed into growing current account deficits.  Fiscal deficits were financed in the main by a 
combination of financial repression and external borrowing, with relatively limited monetization 
to keep inflation low.  As a result of the “twin deficits”, public and external debt grew while 
reserves fell.  External debt almost doubled from $35 billion at the end of 1984/85 to $69 billion 
at the end of 1990/91, with commercial borrowing and remittances of NRIs becoming 
increasingly important as the size of current account deficits exceeded available financing on 
concessional terms.  This in turn meant rising dependence on more costly, shorter maturity 
financing and made India vulnerable to shocks, which came in the form of an oil price hike as a 
result of the 1990 Gulf War and a related disruption in worker remittances.  By September 1990, 
net inflows from non-resident Indian (NRI) deposits had become negative and access to 
commercial borrowing was growing costly and difficult.  Export growth also weakened with slow 
growth in trading partners, the US in particular.   By the end of January 1991, reserves had fallen 
to less than a billion dollars and debt service payments were maintained only by an administrative 
squeeze on imports and emergency financing from the IMF, including a drawdown of $1.8 billion 
under the Compensatory Financing Facility and First Credit Tranche arrangement. Unstable 
coalition politics between the end of the Rajiv Gandhi Congress government in late 1989 and the 
installation of the Narasimha Rao Congress government in June 1991 made matters worse.  India 
suffered a ratings downgrade in early 1991. 
 
  The response to the crisis included a large devaluation, an increase in interest rates and a 
program to implement a large cut in the center’s fiscal deficit.  Equally important was an 
intensification of the process of industrial delicensing and gradual trade liberalization (replacing 
quantitative restrictions with tariffs) which had begun in the second half of the 1980s.  There was 
a push to drastically accelerate these reforms, with the focus then turning to tax reform, further 
trade liberalization (including tariff reductions) and financial sector reforms.   
 
  From the perspective of the this paper, the following points from the 1991 crisis are of 
interest: (i) The higher growth achieved in the second half of the 1980s was not destined to last.  
As RBI (2003a) notes, “…[it] was excessively leveraged through large fiscal deficits and build-up 
of external debt.  In this sense, the growth before the reform was unsustainable.”
65   (ii)  The crisis 
was caused by a combination of deteriorating public finance fundamentals and low international 
liquidity.  Fiscal deficits spilled over into the balance of payments and depleted reserves, making 
India vulnerable to external shocks which came in the form of the 1990 Gulf War.  The crisis thus 
stemmed from a combination of weak fundamentals and a confidence shock that shut off market 
borrowing access.  Cerra and Saxena (2002) also argue that the rupee was overvalued in an 
equilibrium sense at the time of the crisis, the persistent depreciation of the real exchange rate 
over the second half of the 1980s notwithstanding.  (iii)  The crisis led to fiscal and structural 
reforms, which had tangibly positive results over the Eighth Plan period.  (iv) India crucially 
managed to avoid a “credit event”, i.e., a default and/or debt restructuring, which would have 
tarnished its record.  While WPI inflation rose to 14 percent in 1991/92, it was quickly brought 
                                                      
64 The discussion here draws from Acharya (2001), Cerra and Saxena (2002), Chopra et al. (1995) and Virmani (2001). 
65 RBI (2003a) page I-1.     26
under control.  And (v) as emphasized by Acharya (2001) there was a conscious post-crisis 
decision to build up FX reserves and minimize dependence on external debt in financing the 
deficit as part of a crisis-proofing strategy. 
 
Debt Sustainability through the 1990s 
 
Sustainability means the fiscal policy is feasible, i.e., no problems are seen in relation to 
debt servicing in the foreseeable future under prevailing fiscal policies.
66  The idea of solvency is 
simply that the present discounted value of future fiscal primary surpluses (revenues minus non-
interest expenditure) plus seignorage exceed the initial level of debt.
67  This condition applies 
when the real interest rate exceeds the growth rate, which, in the absence of financial repression, 
is typically the case.  Discussions of sustainability and solvency can be conducted at various 
levels of technical complexity.  Be that as it may, tests throughout the 1990s of the solvency 
condition -- based on examining the stationarity of the time series of the nominal debt stock 
discounted back to some historical point in time -- were unable to reject the hypothesis that 
India’s public debt was on an explosive path under prevailing fiscal policies. The operative 
phrase is “under prevailing policies”.  For example, in a seminal paper, Buiter and Patel (1992) 
found, using data from 1970/71 to 1987/88, that the discounted public debt was nonstationary.  
They warned, in the first draft of the same paper which was completed before the 1991 BoP 
crisis, that without a reduction in the primary fiscal deficit, India was heading for a fiscal crisis 
that could exhaust reserves and lead to emergency IMF funding.  While this came to pass, the 
1991 crisis led to well-documented fiscal and structural reforms, which led to an acceleration of 
growth and a decline in the debt/GDP ratio during the Eighth Plan period (1992/93-1996/97).  
Thus, the “prevailing fiscal policies” changed after the 1991 crisis, but not for long. 
 
  Serven (1996) re-examined the solvency of the Indian public sector motivated by the 
observation that by 1996, the fiscal adjustment occasioned by the 1991 crisis appeared to be 
losing steam.  The paper concluded along the lines of Buiter and Patel that debt was on an 
explosive path.  An  additional concern was that, with the introduction of the auction system for 
Treasury Bills and dated securities in 1992/93, interest rates would rise with the growing volume 
of public debt, placing it on an even faster upward trajectory.  Serven presented evidence showing 
that the average interest rate on government debt was rising, which meant that at the margin, 
interest rates were rising even faster, i.e., newly-issued debt was carrying a higher interest rate 
than the inherited debt stock, pushing up the average rate of interest paid.  Serven argued that it 
was only a matter of time before the marginal and average interest rates converged, with a sizable 
impact on deficits and debt.  In addition, the elimination or reduction in financial repression as a 
result of lowering the cash reserve ratio and statutory liquidity ratio for banks combined with a 
move to market-determined prices for government securities would boost interest rates.
68  All this 
would mean three things: (i) interest payments would consume a growing share of revenues and 
reduce the resources available for public spending on infrastructure and the social sectors; (ii) a 
growing burden would fall on monetary policy to keep inflation within target levels.  In other 
words, there was the danger that a “loose fiscal-tight money” policy would emerge; and (iii) as 
debt and interest payments rose, the fiscal latitude to deal with unanticipated shocks, e.g., a bad 
monsoon, would be severely curtailed. 
 
                                                      
66 See Reynolds (2001), which discusses various notions of sustainability and solvency. 
67 Debt, primary fiscal surpluses and seignorage are all expressed as fractions of GDP and the appropriate discount rate 
is the real (nominal) interest rate minus the real (nominal) growth rate. 
68 Revenues from financial repression were estimated by Giovannini and de Melo (1993) as close to 3% of GDP per 
year over 1980-85.  Kletzer and Kohli (2001) come up with higher numbers using the same methodology.     27
  The point about interest rates rising as financial repression fell was taken up in Reynolds 
(2001), to reinforce the case for a fiscal adjustment conducive to growth.  The paper noted that 
Indian public finances were benefiting from growth rates that exceeded interest rates, but this 
difference would erode and even reverse as domestic financial liberalization progressed and the 
volume of debt grew.  The situation would worsen further from the slowing of growth as a result 
of the crowding out of private investment by rising interest rates and the increased financing 
needs of the deficit.  The paper concluded that absent a planned fiscal adjustment, an adjustment 
would be forced by rising real interest rates which would slow growth and poverty reduction, and 
by growing current account deficits creating a vulnerable external position.  In other words, there 
would be a repetition of the 1991 fiscal-BoP crisis.
69  
 
Much of what was anticipated in the preceding papers has occurred after 1997/98 with 
one exception: a solid cushion of foreign exchange reserves has been built up.   However, this 
does not diminish the urgency of fiscal consolidation and reform.  By aiming to build up reserves 
and keep inflation low without an adequate fiscal adjustment, India is at risk of painting itself into 






























                                                      
69 Cashin et al. (2001) compute a debt stock consistent with tax smoothing and then examines the difference between 
actual debt and the “smoothed” debt.  The authors find the difference to be non-stationary and hence indicative of an 
explosive debt path.  (A potential problem with this approach is that the sample period overlaps with the tax and 
financial sector reforms following the 1991 crisis, which led to a reduction both of direct tax revenues and implicit 
taxes from financial repression.  This hopefully temporary decline in taxes would both interfere with any notion of tax 
smoothing and lead to a rise in debt.)   28
Annex 2: Government Debt Dynamics 
 
Debt dynamics are driven by primary deficits and interest payments, which add up to the 
gross fiscal deficit.  As debt is usually expressed as a ratio of GDP, growth also comes into play.  
Equation (1) is the standard difference equation for government debt: 




+ + − = − t
t
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F DR pd d d    , 
where d is the government debt-to-GDP ratio, pd is the ratio of the primary deficit to GDP, DR is 
divestment (privatization) receipts, F stands for the new flow of debt issued in connection with 
financial sector bailouts (both as ratios of GDP), r is the real interest rate, g is the real growth rate 
and the subscript refers to fiscal years.
70  The LHS of (1) is the increase in the debt-GDP ratio 
relative to the previous year.  It is explained by the primary deficit (pd) less divestment revenues 
(DR - as these lower borrowing requirements) plus financial sector bailout costs (F – as these 
necessitate more debt issue).  The last term captures the interaction between interest rates and 
growth: the interest rate determines the interest payment on public debt while growth acts to 
lower the ratio of GGD to GDP.   
The implied difference between the real interest rate and real growth rate for a given year, 
), ( t t g r − can be obtained through straightforward rearrangement of the terms in equation (1).  
The key points to note about the real interest rate thus obtained are (i) it reflects all capital gains 
and losses through real exchange rate changes and inflation on the outstanding stocks of foreign 
currency-denominated and domestic currency debt respectively; and (ii) the implicit GDP deflator 















                                                      









, where i is the nominal interest rate on GGD 
and G is the nominal rate of growth of GDP.   29
Annex 3: Projection of General Government Fiscal Deficit 
 
 
The formula is: 
 
  , 1 − + = t
n
t t t D i PD FD  
 
where FD is the nominal fiscal deficit of the general government, PD is the nominal primary 
deficit, 
n
t i is the nominal interest rate in fiscal year t and D is the nominal level of debt.  Note that: 
 
•  while it would strictly be conceptually correct, we ignore SEB losses in computing PD 
•  we use D ignoring the calling of guarantees, but reflecting SEB losses. 
 
The reasons for ignoring SEB losses (although their effect is captured in debt levels and hence 
interest payments) is for comparability with existing reporting practices for general government 
fiscal deficits (which do not incorporate either SEB losses or make any provision for guarantees). 
 





























pd fd  where: 
 
G is the nominal growth rate of GDP.  Using the standard formulas for the nominal interest rate 
and nominal growth rate gives the full formula: 
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t π is the inflation rate (the other variables are the same as defined in Annex  2). 
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